Contraddizione e paradosso in Hegel


Adalberto Coltelluccio (Liceo delle Scienze Umane "Pascasino", Marsala)


In this paper, I argue that Hegel‟s dialectic accepts true contradictions. His logic violates the Aristotelian principle of contradiction. However, contradictions are not irreducible and do not generate paradoxes, because they are always resolved. Therefore, Hegelian dialectic cannot be defined as aporetic, as it lacks the connection between contradiction and recursive self-
reference. Hegel uses an original strategy in order to get over the contradiction, which is neither the Scholastic „reductio‟ nor the logical „parameterization‟. It is conceived as an opposite „overwhelming‟ another opposite.

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